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APPLICATION NO.	FILING DATE	FIRST NAMED INVENTOR	ATTORNEY DOCKET NO.	CONFIRMATION NO.
09/832,921	04/12/2001	Kazunori Masaki	35.G2772	5234
5514	7590	09/09/2004	EXAMINER	
Fitzpatrick Cella Harper & Scinto 30 Rockefeller Plaza New York, NY 10112			Fischer, Andrew J	
			ART UNIT	PAPER NUMBER
			3627	

DATE MAILED: 09/09/2004

Please find below and/or attached an Office communication concerning this application or proceeding.

Office Action Summary	Application No.	Applicant(s)
	09/832,921	MASAKI, KAZUNORI
Examiner	Art Unit	
Andrew J. Fischer	3627	

-- The MAILING DATE of this communication appears on the cover sheet with the correspondence address --

A SHORTENED STATUTORY PERIOD FOR REPLY IS SET TO EXPIRE 3 MONTH(S) FROM THE MAILING DATE OF THIS COMMUNICATION.

- Extensions of time may be available under the provisions of 37 CFR 1.136(a). In no event, however, may a reply be timely filed after SIX (6) MONTHS from the mailing date of this communication.
- If the period for reply specified above is less than thirty (30) days, a reply within the statutory minimum of thirty (30) days will be considered timely.
- If NO period for reply is specified above, the maximum statutory period will apply and will expire SIX (6) MONTHS from the mailing date of this communication.
- Failure to reply within the set or extended period for reply will, by statute, cause the application to become ABANDONED (35 U.S.C. § 133). Any reply received by the Office later than three months after the mailing date of this communication, even if timely filed, may reduce any earned patent term adjustment. See 37 CFR 1.704(b).

Status

1) Responsive to communication(s) filed on 07 July 2004.

2a) This action is **FINAL**. 2b) This action is non-final.

3) Since this application is in condition for allowance except for formal matters, prosecution as to the merits is closed in accordance with the practice under *Ex parte Quayle*, 1935 C.D. 11, 453 O.G. 213.

Disposition of Claims

4) Claim(s) 1-9,43-51,67 and 68 is/are pending in the application.
4a) Of the above claim(s) _____ is/are withdrawn from consideration.

5) Claim(s) _____ is/are allowed.

6) Claim(s) 1-9,43-51,67 and 68 is/are rejected.

7) Claim(s) _____ is/are objected to.

8) Claim(s) _____ are subject to restriction and/or election requirement.

Application Papers

9) The specification is objected to by the Examiner.

10) The drawing(s) filed on _____ is/are: a) accepted or b) objected to by the Examiner.

Applicant may not request that any objection to the drawing(s) be held in abeyance. See 37 CFR 1.85(a).

Replacement drawing sheet(s) including the correction is required if the drawing(s) is objected to. See 37 CFR 1.121(d).

11) The oath or declaration is objected to by the Examiner. Note the attached Office Action or form PTO-152.

Priority under 35 U.S.C. § 119

12) Acknowledgment is made of a claim for foreign priority under 35 U.S.C. § 119(a)-(d) or (f).
a) All b) Some * c) None of:
1. Certified copies of the priority documents have been received.
2. Certified copies of the priority documents have been received in Application No. _____.
3. Copies of the certified copies of the priority documents have been received in this National Stage application from the International Bureau (PCT Rule 17.2(a)).

* See the attached detailed Office action for a list of the certified copies not received.

Attachment(s)

1) Notice of References Cited (PTO-892)
2) Notice of Draftsperson's Patent Drawing Review (PTO-948)
3) Information Disclosure Statement(s) (PTO-1449 or PTO/SB/08)
Paper No(s)/Mail Date .

4) Interview Summary (PTO-413)
Paper No(s)/Mail Date. ____ .

5) Notice of Informal Patent Application (PTO-152)

6) Other: _____

DETAILED ACTION

Continued Examination Under 37 C.F.R. §1.114

1. A request for continued examination (“RCE”) under 37 C.F.R. §1.114, including the fee set forth in 37 C.F.R. §1.17(e), was filed in this application after final rejection. Since this application is eligible for continued examination under 37 C.F.R. §1.114, and the fee set forth in 37 C.F.R. §1.17(e) has been timely paid, the finality of the previous Office Action (mailed March 8, 2004) has been withdrawn pursuant to 37 C.F.R. §1.114.

Acknowledgements

2. In accordance with the RCE noted above, Applicant’s after final amendment filed April 21, 2004 has been entered. Accordingly, claims 1-9, 43-51, 67, and 68 remain pending.

3. The examiner for this application has changed. Please designate Examiner Andrew J. Fischer as the Examiner of record in all future correspondences.

4. This Office Action is written in OACS. Because of this, the Examiner is unable to control formatting, paragraph numbering, font, spelling, line spacing, and/or other word processing issues. The Examiner sincerely apologizes for these errors.

Specification

5. The specification is objected to as failing to provide proper antecedent basis for the claimed subject matter. See 37 C.F.R. §1.75(d)(1), MPEP §608.01(o), and MPEP §2181. The specification is replete with these errors. Some examples follow:

- a. The “means for detecting a request for a designed item” as recited in claim 4.
- b. The “means for presenting a user interface” as recited in claim 4.

- c. The “means for detecting a basic service requested by a user” as recited in claim 43.

Claim Rejections - 35 USC §101

6. 35 U.S.C. §101 reads as follows:

Whoever invents or discovers any new and useful process, machine, manufacture, or composition of matter, or any new and useful improvement thereof, may obtain a patent therefor, subject to the conditions and requirements of this title.

7. Claims 7-9 and 45-48 are rejected under 35 U.S.C. §101 because the claimed invention is directed to non-statutory subject matter. The basis of this rejection is set forth in a two-prong test:

- (1) The invention must be within the technological arts; and
 - (2) The invention must produce a useful, concrete, and tangible result.

8. Prong (1) requires the claimed invention to be within the technological arts. See *In re Musgrave*, 431 F.2d 882, 167 USPQ 280, 289-90 (C.C.P.A. 1970); and *In re Johnston*, 502 F.2d 765, 183 USPQ 172, 177 (C.C.P.A. 1974). Mere abstract ideas (*i.e.*, laws of nature, natural phenomena) that do not apply, involve, use, or advance the technological arts fail to promote the “progress of science and the useful arts”¹ and are therefore non-statutory subject matter.²

9. For a process (*i.e.* claims 46 and 46), the claimed process must somehow apply, involve, use, or advance the technological arts. Mere intended or nominal use of a component—albeit within the technological arts—does not confer statutory subject matter to an otherwise abstract

¹ It is the Examiner’s position that “technological arts” is synonymous with “useful arts” as stated in the U.S. Constitution, Art. I, §8. See *In re Waldbaum*, 457 F.2d 997, 173 USPQ 430, 434 (C.C.P.A. 1972).

² *E.g.*, the physical sciences are statutory; *c.f.*, social sciences which are non-statutory

idea if the component does not apply, involve, use, or advance the underlying process. In other words, if the invention in the body of the claim is not tied to a technological art, environment, or machine, the claim is non-statutory. *Ex parte Bowman*, 61 USPQ2d 1665, 1671 (B.P.A.I. 2001) (Unpublished). See also MPEP §2106 IV B. 2 (b) ii). The Examiner recommends (by way of example only) positive recitation of a computer or other technology within the body of the claim if the specification supports such an amendment.

10. Regarding the product claims (*i.e.* claims 47 and 48), they too fail to produce a useful, concrete, and tangible result.

Claim Rejections - 35 USC §112 2nd Paragraph

11. The following is a quotation of the 2nd paragraph of 35 U.S.C. §112:

The specification shall conclude with one or more claims particularly pointing out and distinctly claiming the subject matter which the applicant regards as his invention.

12. Claims 1-9, 43-51, 67, and 68 are rejected under 35 U.S.C. §112, 2nd paragraph, as being indefinite for failing to particularly point out and distinctly claim the subject matter which applicant regards as the invention. The claims are replete with errors. Some examples follow:

13. Claim 1, 7, 47 and 49 are indefinite because it is unclear if the selection is disjunctive or conjunctive. The claim reads “and making it conjunctive. Applicant argues it should be disjunctive. In other words, must the user select “the designated pay service and a pay serve other than the designated pay service” as claimed or is the phrase meant to be disjunctive? If disjunctive is desired, the Examiner suggests changing the phrase to “or.”

Art Unit: 3627

14. If 35 U.S.C. 112 6th paragraph is desired to be invoked in at least claims 4 and 43, Applicant has not clearly linked and associated the “means for” phrases to any corresponding structure.

This is an alternative rejection. If Applicant desires not to invoke 35 U.S.C. 112 6th paragraph, this particular 112 2nd paragraph rejection will be withdrawn.

15. Claims 43, 45, 47, and 67 are indefinite because the metes and bounds of “a basic service” can not be determined.

Claim Rejections - 35 USC §102

16. The following is a quotation of the appropriate paragraphs of 35 U.S.C. §102 that form the basis for the rejections under this section made in this Office Action:

A person shall be entitled to a patent unless –

(a) the invention was known or used by others in this country, or patented or described in a printed publication in this or a foreign country, before the invention thereof by the applicant for a patent.

(b) the invention was patented or described in a printed publication in this or a foreign country or in public use or on sale in this country, more than one year prior to the date of application for patent in the United States. . . .

(e) the invention was described in (1) an application for patent, published under section 122(b), by another filed in the United States before the invention by the applicant for patent or (2) a patent granted on an application for patent by another filed in the United States before the invention by the applicant for patent, except that an international application filed under the treaty defined in section 351(a) shall have the effects for purposes of this subsection of an application filed in the United States only if the international application designated the United States and was published under Article 21(2) of such treaty in the English language.

17. Claims 1, 2, 4, 5, 7, 8, 49, 50, as understood by the Examiner, are rejected under 35 U.S.C. §102(b) as being anticipated by Joseph (U.S. 5,878,401). Joseph discloses as noted in the previous office action.

18. Claims 1, 2, 4, 5, 7, 8, 43-50, 67, and 68, as understood by the Examiner, are rejected under 35 U.S.C. §102(b) as being anticipated by Walker (U.S. 6,119,099) (“Walker ‘099”). Walker ‘099 also discloses as noted in the previous office action.

19. Finally, claims 1-9, 43-51, 67 and 68, as understood by the Examiner, are rejected under 35 U.S.C. §102(b) as being anticipated by Huberman (U.S. 5,826,244). Huberman discloses detecting a request for services (for printer services); detecting an upper limit to be paid for the services (the upper limit with the user's price range); displaying a user interface (a webpage) to enable a user to select one of the designated pay service (the lowest bidder) or a pay service other than the designated pay service (the non lowest bidder or even some completely new service within the user's price range).

Claim Rejections - 35 USC §103

20. The following is a quotation of 35 U.S.C. §103(a) which forms the basis for all obviousness rejections set forth in this Office Action:

(a) A patent may not be obtained though the invention is not identically disclosed or described as set forth in section 102 of this title, if the differences between the subject matter sought to be patented and the prior art are such that the subject matter as a whole would have been obvious at the time the invention was made to a person having ordinary skill in the art to which said subject matter pertains. Patentability shall not be negated by the manner in which the invention was made.

21. Claims 1, 2, 4, 5, 7, 8, 49, 50, as understood by the Examiner, are alternatively rejected under 35 U.S.C. §103(a) as being unpatentable over Joseph.³ It is the Examiner's principle position that the claims are anticipated because inherently discloses pay services.

However if not inherent, the Examiner takes Official Notice that services are sold and auctioned on the Internet. Therefore it would have been obvious to a person having ordinary skill in the art at the time the invention was made to modify Joseph to substitute services for

³ See MPEP §2112 expressly authorizing alternative §102/§103 rejections when the question of inherency is present in the anticipation rejection.

Art Unit: 3627

products. It is the Examiner's position that paying for either a products or services have become art recognized equivalents. See MPEP §2144.06.

22. Claims 1-9, 43-51, 67 and 68, as understood by the Examiner, are also alternatively rejected under 35 U.S.C. §103(a) as being unpatentable over Huberman. Again, it is the Examiner's principle position that the claims are anticipated. However if not anticipated, it would have been obvious to a person having ordinary skill in the art at the time the invention was made to modify Huberman to include any missing features. These modifications would be considered insubstantial and will not patentably distinguish the claimed invention over the prior art.

23. After careful review of the specification and prosecution history, the Examiner is unaware of any desire—either expressly or implicitly—by Applicant to be his own lexicographer and to define a claim term to have a meaning other than its ordinary and accustomed meaning. Therefore, the Examiner starts with the heavy presumption that all claim limitations are given their ordinary and accustomed meaning. See *Bell Atlantic Network Services Inc. v. Covad Communications Group Inc.*, 262 F.3d 1258, 1268, 59 USPQ2d 1865, 1870 (Fed. Cir. 2001) (“[T]here is a heavy presumption in favor of the ordinary meaning of claim language as understood by one of ordinary skill in the art.”); *CCS Fitness Inc. v. Brunswick Corp.*, 288 F.3d 1359, 1366, 62 USPQ2d 1658, 1662 (Fed. Cir. 2002) (There is a “heavy presumption that a claim term carries its ordinary and customary meaning.”). See also MPEP §2111.01 and *In re Zletz*, 893 F.2d 319, 321, 13 USPQ2d 1320, 1322 (Fed. Cir. 1989).⁴

⁴ It is the Examiner's position that “plain meaning” and “ordinary and accustomed meaning” are synonymous. See e.g. *Rexnord Corp. v. Laitram Corp.*, 274 F.3d 1336, 1342, 60 USPQ2d 1851, 1854 (Fed. Cir. 2001) (“[A]ll terms in a patent claim are to be given their plain, ordinary and accustomed meaning . . .”).

In accordance with the ordinary and accustomed meaning presumption, during examination the claims are interpreted with their “broadest reasonable interpretation” *In re Morris*, 127 F.3d 1048, 1054, 44 USPQ2d 1023, 1027 (Fed. Cir. 1997). See also MPEP §2111.

However, if Applicant disagrees with the Examiner and has either (a) already used lexicography or (b) wishes to use lexicography and therefore (under either (a) or (b)) desires a claim limitation to have a meaning other than its ordinary and accustomed meaning, the Examiner respectfully requests Applicant in his next response to expressly indicate⁵ the claim limitation at issue and to show where in the specification or prosecution history the limitation is defined. Such definitions must be clearly stated in the specification or file history. *Bell Atlantic*, 262 F.3d at 1268, 59 USPQ2d at 1870, (“[I]n redefining the meaning of particular claim terms away from the ordinary meaning, the intrinsic evidence must ‘clearly set forth’ or ‘clearly redefine’ a claim term so as to put one reasonably skilled in the art on notice that the patentee intended to so redefine the claim term”).⁶ The Examiner cautions that no new matter is allowed.

⁵ “Absent an *express intent* to impart a novel meaning, terms in a claim are to be given their ordinary and accustomed meaning. [Emphasis added.]” *Wenger Manufacturing Inc. v. Coating Mach. Sys., Inc.*, 239 F.3d 1225, 1232, 57 USPQ2d 1679, 1684 (Fed. Cir. 2001) (citations and quotations omitted). “In the absence of an *express intent* to impart a novel meaning to claim terms, an inventor’s claim terms take on their ordinary meaning. We indulge a heavy presumption that a claim term carries its ordinary and customary meaning. [Emphasis added.]” *Teleflex Inc. v. Ficosa North America Corp.*, 299 F.3d 1313, 1325, 63 USPQ2d 1374, 1380 (Fed. Cir. 2002) (citations and quotations omitted).

⁶ See also *Vitronics Corp. v. Conceptronic, Inc.*, 90 F.3d 1576, 1582, 39 USPQ2d 1573, 1576 (Fed. Cir. 1996), (“[A] patentee may choose to be his own lexicographer and use terms in a manner other than their ordinary meaning, *as long as* the special definition of the term is *clearly stated* in the patent specification or file history. [Emphasis added.]”); *Multiform Desiccants Inc. v. Medzam Ltd.*, 133 F.3d 1473, 1477, 45 USPQ2d 1429, 1432 (Fed. Cir. 1998) (“Such special meaning, however, must be sufficiently clear in the specification that any departure from common usage would be so understood by a person of experience in the field of the invention.”). See also MPEP §2111.01, subsection titled “Applicant May Be Own Lexicographer” and MPEP §2173.05(a) titled “New Terminology.”

Applicant is reminded that failure by Applicant in his next response to properly traverse this issue in accordance with 37 C.F.R. §1.111(b) or to be non-responsive to this issue entirely will be considered a desire by Applicant to forgo lexicography in this application and to continue having the claims interpreted with their broadest reasonable interpretation.⁷ Additionally, it is the Examiner's position that the above requirements are reasonable.⁸ Unless expressly noted otherwise by the Examiner, the preceding discussion on claim interpretation principles applies to all examined claims currently pending.

24. To the extent that the Examiner's interpretations are in dispute with Applicant's interpretations, the Examiner hereby adopts the following definitions—under the broadest reasonable interpretation standard—in all his claim interpretations.⁹ Moreover, while the following list is provided in accordance with *In re Morris*, the definitions are a guide to claim terminology since claim terms must be interpreted in context of the surrounding claim language.¹⁰ Finally, the following list is not intended to be exhaustive in any way:

⁷ See 37 C.F.R. §1.104(c)(3) which states in part: “the examiner may rely upon admissions by applicant . . . as to *any matter* affecting patentability . . . [Emphasis added.]”

⁸ The Examiner's requirements on this matter are reasonable on at least two separate and independent grounds. First, the Examiner's requirements are simply an express request for clarification of how Applicant intends his claims to be interpreted so that lexicography (or even an *attempt* at lexicography) by Applicant is not inadvertently overlooked by the Examiner. Second, the requirements are reasonable in view of the USPTO's goals of compact prosecution, productivity with particular emphasis on reductions in both pendency and cycle time, and other goals as outlined in the USPTO's The 21st Century Strategic Plan, February 3, 2003 available at www.uspto.gov/web/offices/com/strat21/index.htm (last accessed September 7, 2004).

⁹ While most definitions are cited because these terms are found in the claims, the Examiner may have provided additional definitions to help interpret words, phrases, or concepts found in the definitions themselves or in the prior art.

¹⁰ See e.g. *Brookhill-Wilk I LLC v. Intuitive Surgical Inc.*, 334 F.3d 1294, 1300, 67 USPQ2d 1132, 1137 (Fed. Cir. 2003) (abstract dictionary definitions are not alone determinative; “resort must always be made to the surrounding text of the claims in question”).

Network: “A group of computers and associated network devices that are connected by communications facilities.” Computer Dictionary, 3rd Edition, Microsoft Press, Redmond, WA, 1997.¹¹

Server: “2. On the Internet or other network, a computer or program that responds to commands from a client.” *Id.* **Client:** “3. On a local area network or Internet, a computer that accesses shared network resources provided by another computer (called a server).” *Id.*

Computer: “Any machine that does three things: accepts structured input, processes it according to prescribed rules, and produces the results as output.” *Id.*

25. Additionally, the Examiner notes that “the PTO and the CCPA acknowledged product-by-process claims as an exception to the general rule requiring claims to define products in terms of structural characteristics.” *Atlantic Thermoplastics Co. v. Faytex Corp.*, 970 F.2d 834, 845, 23 USPQ2d 1481, 1490 (Fed. Cir. 1992) (hereinafter “*Atlantic Thermoplastics v. Faytex I*”). Furthermore, the Federal Circuit “acknowledges that it has in effect recognized . . . product-by-process claims as exceptional.” *Atlantic Thermoplastics v. Faytex I*, 970 F.2d at 847, 23 USPQ2d at 1491.

Because of this exceptional status, the Examiner has carefully reviewed the claims and it is the Examiner’s position that claims 1-9, 43-51, 67 and 68 *do not* contain any product-by-

¹¹ Based upon Applicant’s disclosure, the art of record, and the knowledge of one of ordinary skill in this art as determined by the factors discussed in MPEP §2141.03 (where practical), the Examiner finds that the *Microsoft Press Computer Dictionary* is an appropriate technical dictionary known to be used by one of ordinary skill in this art. See e.g. *Altiris Inc. v. Symantec Corp.*, 318 F.3d 1363, 1373, 65 USPQ2d 1865, 1872 (Fed. Cir. 2003) where the Federal Circuit used the *Microsoft Press Computer Dictionary* (3d ed.) as “a technical dictionary” to define the term “flag.” See also *In re Barr*, 444 F.2d 588, 170 USPQ 330 (CCPA 1971)(noting that its appropriate to use technical dictionaries in order to ascertain the meaning of a term of art) and MPEP §2173.05(a) titled ‘New Terminology.’

process limitations whether in a conventional format or otherwise. If Applicant disagrees with the Examiner, the Examiner respectfully requests Applicant in his next response to expressly point out any product-by-process claim(s) and their limitations so that they may be afforded their exceptional status and treated accordingly. Applicant is reminded that “even though product-by-process claims are limited by and defined by the process, determination of patentability is based on the product itself.” *In re Thorpe*, 777 F.2d 695, 697, 227 USPQ 964, 966 (Fed. Cir. 1985) (citations omitted).¹² Failure by Applicant in his next response to also address this issue in accordance with 37 C.F.R. §1.111(b) or to be non-responsive to this issue entirely will be considered intent by Applicant *not* to recite any product-by-process limitations. Unless expressly noted otherwise by the Examiner, the preceding discussion on product-by-process principles applies to all examined claims currently pending.

26. Although Applicant uses “means for” in the claim(s) (e.g. claim 4 recites “means for detecting a request”), it is the Examiner’s position that the “means for” phrase(s) do not invoke 35 U.S.C. 112 6th paragraph. If Applicant concurs, the Examiner respectfully requests Applicant to either amend the claim(s) to remove all instances of “means for” from the claim(s), or to explicitly state on the record why 35 U.S.C. 112 6th paragraph should not be invoked. Alternatively, if Applicant desires to invoke 35 U.S.C. 112 6th paragraph, the Examiner respectfully requests Applicant to expressly state his desire on the record. Upon receiving such express invocation of 35 U.S.C. 112 6th paragraph, the “means for” phrase(s) will be interpreted as set forth in the *Supplemental Examination Guidelines for Determining the Applicability of 35*

¹² See also MPEP §2113.

Art Unit: 3627

*USC 112 6¶.*¹³ Failure by Applicant in his next response to also address the 35 U.S.C. 112 6th paragraph issues in accordance with 37 C.F.R. §1.111(b) or to be non-responsive to this issue entirely will be considered a desire by Applicant NOT to invoke 35 U.S.C. 112 6th paragraph. Unless expressly noted otherwise by the Examiner, the preceding discussion on 35 U.S.C. 112 6th paragraph applies to all examined claims currently pending.

Response to Arguments

27. Applicant's arguments filed July 7, 2004 have been fully considered but they are not persuasive.

28. With respect to Joseph, Applicant argues that Joseph does not anticipate because the user can select both. As noted above, claim 1 however recites "a desired *one* of." "One" is not both.

29. Applicant essentially makes the same argument for Walker '099. As noted above, because the claims require only "one of," Applicant's arguments are not persuasive.

Conclusion

30. References considered pertinent to Applicant's disclosure are listed on form PTO-892.

31. The following two (2) citations to the Manual of Patent Examining Procedure ("MPEP") apply to this Office Action: MPEP citations to Chapters 100, 200, 500, 600, 700, 1000, 1100, 1300, 1400, 1500, 1700, 1800, 2000, 2100, 2200, 2500, 2600, and 2700 are from the MPEP 8th Edition, Rev. 2, May 2004. All remaining MPEP citations are from MPEP 8th Edition, August 2001.

¹³ Federal Register Vol. 65, No. 120, June 21, 2000.

32. Information regarding the status of an application may be obtained from the Patent Application Information Retrieval (PAIR) system. Status information for published applications may be obtained from either Private PAIR or Public PAIR. Status information for unpublished applications is available through Private PAIR only. For more information about the PAIR system, see <http://pair-direct.uspto.gov>. Should you have questions on access to the Private PAIR system, contact the Electronic Business Center (EBC) at 866-217-9197 (toll-free).

33. In accordance with *In re Lee*, 277 F.3d 1338, 1344-45, 61 USPQ2d 1430, 1434-35 (Fed. Cir. 2002), the Examiner finds that the references How Computers Work Millennium Ed. by Ron White; How Networks Work, Millennium Ed. by Frank J. Derfler et. al.; and How the Internet Works, Millennium Ed. by Preston Gralla are additional evidence of what is basic knowledge or common sense to one of ordinary skill in this art. Each reference is cited in its entirety. Moreover, because these three references are directed towards beginners (see e.g. “User Level Beginning . . .”), because of the references’ basic content (which is self-evident upon review of the references), and after further review of the entire application and all the art now of record in conjunction with the factors as discussed in MPEP §2141.03 (where practical), the Examiner finds that these three references are primarily directed towards those of low skill in this art. Because these three references are directed towards those of low skill in this art, the Examiner finds that one of ordinary skill in this art must—at the very least—be aware of and understand the knowledge and information contained within these three references.

34. In accordance with the USPTO’s goals of customer service, compact prosecution, and reduction of cycle time, the Examiner has made every effort to clarify his position regarding claim interpretation and any rejections or objections in this application. Furthermore, the Examiner has again provided Applicants with notice—for due process purposes—of his position

Art Unit: 3627

regarding his factual determinations and legal conclusions. The Examiner notes and thanks Applicant for his "Remarks" (beginning on page 9) traversing the Examiner's positions on various points. If Applicant disagrees with any additional factual determination or legal conclusion made by the Examiner in this Office Action whether expressly stated or implied,¹⁴ the Examiner respectfully reminds Applicant to properly traverse the Examiner's position(s) in accordance with 37 C.F.R. §1.111(b) in his next properly filed response. By addressing these issues now, matters where the Examiner and Applicant agree can be eliminated allowing the Examiner and Applicant to focus on areas of disagreement (if any) with the goal towards allowance in the shortest possible time. If Applicant has any questions regarding the Examiner's positions or has other questions regarding this communication or even previous communications, Applicant is strongly encouraged to contact Examiner Andrew J. Fischer whose telephone number is (703) 305-0292. If attempts to reach the Examiner by telephone are unsuccessful, the Examiner's immediate supervisor, Robert Olszewski, can be reached at (703) 308-5183. The fax number for facsimile responses is now (703) 872-9306.

The signature is handwritten in black ink. It appears to read "AJ Fischer" followed by the date "9/7/04".

Andrew J. Fischer
Primary Examiner
Art Unit 3627

AJF
September 7, 2004

¹⁴ E.g., if the Examiner rejected a claim under §103 with two references, although not directly stated, it is the Examiner's implied position that the references are analogous art.